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[47 C.2d 729; 306 P.2d 432] 
majority are likevvise without merit. Inasmuch as 
the court even as on the clerk's 
did not any action force of the order 
or of any statute, the to the clerk 
for issuing au certifieate is irrelevant. As to the 
argument that the b;mk was not in upon 
purported release it sufJ1ces to say t1u1t such a result 
would cast a burden upon the to 
amine the court records to asrertain 
of any attachments upon held him. 
that the garnishee may not rely upon an served by an 
officer of the court, conld only result in eonfusion of the here-
tofore workable praetices the release of attachments. 
For the reason that the release order was unjustified by 
either court order or statute, I am of the opinion that the 
sheriff is liable for the losR from his 's breach 
of official duty and, aceordingly, I would n•Ycrse the judgment. 
[S. F. No. 19552. In Bank. Jan. 25, 1957.] 
INGA A. BRANDELIUS et al., Appellants, v. CITY AND 
COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO et al., Respondents. 
[1] New Trial-Discretion-Review.--The granting of a motion 
for new trial rests so completely within the discretion of 
the trial court that its action will not be disturbed unless a 
manifest and unmistakable abuse of discretion clearly appears. 
[2] Appeal-Presumptions-Orders on Motion for New TriaL-On 
appeal all presumptions are in favor of an order granting new 
trial. 
[3] Id.-Grounds of Decision Below-Order Granting New TriaL-
An order granting new trial will be affirmed if it may be sus-
tained on any ground, although the reviewing court might have 
ruled differently in the first instance. 
[1] See Cal.Jur., New Trial, § 13; Am.Jur., K ew Trial, §§ 201, 
202. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] New Trial,§ 12(3); [2] Appeal and 
Error, § 1197; [3] Appeal and Error § 1014; [4] Carriers, § 61; 
[5] Carriers, §140; [6] Carriers, §H1; [7] Death, §42; [8, 10-15] 
Negligence,§48; [9,16,17] §217; [18,19] New'frial, 
§ 124; [20] Carriers, § 147. 
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of Relation of Carrier and 
relation of passenger and carrier 
terminates when a streetcar passenger alights on a public 
street and clears the ear from which he alights, but under the 
circumstances of the case the relation may still continue until 
the reaches a place outside the sphere of any activity 
of the which constitute a mobile or 
animated hazard to the passenger, or until he has had a 
reasonable of away from the car without 
[5] !d.-Passengers-Questions of Law and Fact.-In an action 
against a municipality and others for wrongful death of a 
man after alighting from a municipal cable car, was 
struck by another car coming from the opposite direction, 
where there was evidence which would support the conclusion 
that deceased alighted in the only possible way between the 
tracks, that the narrow space between passing cars was not 
safe for the discharge of passengers if a car from the op-
posite direction should then approach, especially when un-
noticed, and that deceased had not had a reasonable oppor-
tunity to get away before being struck, whether the carrier-
passenger relationship had terminated was properly left to the 
jury as a question of fact. 
[6a, 6b] Id.-Passengers-Instructions.-In an action against a 
municipality and others for wrongful death of a man who, after 
alighting from a municipal cable car, was struck by another 
car coming from the opposite direction, it was not improper 
to give an instruction on the presumption of due care on the 
part of deceased where the testimony of plaintiffs' witnesses 
was not wholly irreconcilable with the pr0smnption. 
[7) Death-Actions for Wrongful Death-Presumptions.-While 
under some circumstances there is no room for the presumption 
of due care where the party whose claimed negligence is at 
issue either himself testifies or introduces evidence in his 
behalf as to his acts and conduct immediately preceding and at 
the time of the accident, the benefit of the presumption is 
available if sueh person be deceased and the testimony of 
plaintiffs' witnesses respecting the deceased's acts and conduct 
at the time involved is not wholly irreconcilable with the 
presumption. 
[8] Negligence-Last Clear Chance.-The time element is the all 
important factor in the doctrine of last clear chance; if such 
doctrine is to he applied and a recovery permitted despite the 
[ 4] See Cal.Jur.2d, § 22; Am.Jur., Carriers, § 1004. 
[8] Availability of last clear chance doctrine to defendant, note, 
32 A.L.R.2d 543. See also Cal.Jur., Negligence, § 80 et seq.; Am. 
Jur., Negligence, § 215 et seq. 
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substantial evidenee to show that 
chance to avoid the aecident by the 
731 
be 
lowing the tillle the party had lost any similnr oppor-
tunity to avoid the accident the use oJ such care. 
[9] !d.-Instructions-Last Clear Chance.-If an instruction on 
last clear chanee be it essential that the be cor-
rectly instructed the time Jor deJendant's required 
exercise of any alleged last clear chance. 
[10] Id.-Last Clear Chance.-The last clear ehance doctrine places 
its emphasis on the time sequence of events and holds de-
fendant liable if, immediately prior to the harm, he has the 
superior opportunity to avoid it. 
[11] Id.-Last Clear Chance.--The last clear chance doctrine pre-
supposes that plaintiff has been negligent and, as a result 
thereof, is in a position of danger from which he cannot escape 
by the exercise of ordinary care, and this inclndes not only 
where it is physically impossible for him to escape, but also in 
cases where he is totally unaware of his danger and for that 
reason unable to escape; that defendant has knowledge that 
plaintiff is in such situation, and knows, or in the exercise of 
ordinary care should know, that plaintiff cannot eseape; and 
that defendant has the last elear chance to avoid the accident 
by exercising ordinary care and fails to do so, and plaintiff is 
injured as a result of such negligence. 
[12] Id.-Last Clear Chance.-The time fM defendant's exercise 
of any last clear chance commences only at such time as he has 
both actual knowledge of the injured person's "position of 
danger" and actual or constructive knowledge that such person 
"cannot escape from such situation." 
[13] Id.-Last Clear Chance.-The time when defendant is charge-
able with actual knowledge of the injured person's position of 
danger may substantially precede the time when defendant is 
chargeable with actual or constructive knowledge of the in-
jured person's inability to escape therefrom, but defendant is 
not liable under the last clear chance doctrine unless after 
the time that he is chargeable with the required knowledge of 
the injured's person's inability to escape, he has the last clear 
chance to avoid the accident by exercising ordinary care. 
[14] Id.-Last Clear Chance.-Under the last clear chance doc-
trine, actual knowledge of plaintiff's position of danger is re-
quired, but constructive knowledge of his inability to escape 
will suffice. 
[15] Id.-Last Clear Chance.-The last clear chance doctrine may 
be invoked if, and only if, the trier of facts finds from the evi-
dence that plaintiff was in a position of danger and, by his 
own negligence, became unable to escape from such position 
732 BRANDELn;s v. CITY & CouNTY OF S. F. [47 C.2d 
physically 
or was totally un-
defendant knew that plaintiff was 
and further knew, or in the exercise of 
have known, that plaintiff was unable to 
escape ; and that thereafter defendant had the last 
clear chance to avoid the accident the exercise of ordinary 
care but failed to exercise such last clear chance, and the 
accident occurred as a result of such failure. 
!d.-Instructions-Last Clear Chauce.-Amplification of the 
last clear chance formula in instructions is not objectionable 
if such amplification does not tend to confuse and mislead the 
jury on the essential elements for application of the doctrine. 
[17] !d.-Instructions-Last Clear Chance.-In ordinary nsage, the 
terms "position of danger" and "perilous situation" would be 
practically synonymous, but if the term "perilous situation," 
as used in two places in an instruction on last clear chance 
with reference to defendant's knowledge of such situation, was 
intended to be synonymous with the term "position of danger" 
as used in another place with reference to the injured party's 
getting into a position of danger by his own negligence, the 
instruction was erroneous, since commencement of the time 
for the exercise of any last chance would then be conditioned 
solely on defendant's actual knowledge of the injured party's 
"position of danger." 
[18] New Trial-Errors in Law-Errors Relating to Instructions. 
-Canst., art. VI, § 4:lj2 , should control the action of the trial 
court in considering a motion for new trial, but where the trial 
court has determined that error in instructions was prejudicial 
and granted the motion, the sole issue before the appellate 
court is whether the trial court abused its discretion. 
[19] !d.-Errors in Law-Errors Relating to Instructions.-An 
appellate court will reverse an order granting a new trial on 
the ground that an instruction on last clear chance was erro-
neous only if, assuming the facts warranted instructions on the 
doctrine, the questioned instruction was absolutely accurate 
and under no reasonable interpretation could possibly have 
misled or confused the jury. 
[20] Carriers-Passengers-Instructions-Last Clear Chance.-In 
an action against a n:mnicipality and others for wrongful death 
of a man who, after alighting from a municipal cable car, was 
struck by another car coming from the opposite direction, 
there was substantial evidence to justify an instruction on last 
clear chance where conflicting inferences could he drawn from 
testimony concerning the time the gripman of the other car 
knew that deceased was in a position of danger and further 
knew, or in the exercise of ordinary care should have known, 
that deceased was unable to escape therefrom, where the jury 
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was not bound by such 
when the other 
of 
APPEAl_~ from an of 
and County of San F'raueiseo 
II albert, Affirmed. 
that deceased 
which the jury 
off his car 
Action for damages for drath. Order granting 
defendants a new affinned. 
Hoberg & for 
Dion R. Holm, City Attorney, and ,Jerome Cohen, Deputy 
City Attorney, for 
SPENCE, ,T.-Plainiiffs from an ordel' granting de-
fendants' motion for a new trial in an action for alleged 
wrongful draih. 'l'he orda· that the new trial was 
granted "solely" brcausc the court felt that "the jury was 
not properly insiruete<1. '' 'l'he ~' of the order there-
fore depenc1s 11pon n tldermimliion of \Yhethrl' ihe trial court 
had correctly instructed the jury. The challenged instruc-
tions relate to the following subjects: (1) the degree of care 
required of a carrier with to an alighting passenger; 
(2) the presnmption of due care in relation to the deceased's 
conduct; and ( 3) the doctrine of last clear chance. 
[1] It is well settled that the granting of a motion for 
a new trial rests so completely within the discretion of the 
trial court that its action will not be disturbed unless a mani-
fest and unmistakable abuse of discretion clearly appears. 
(Mazzotta v. Los Angeles Ry. Corp., 25 Cal.2d 165, 169 [153 
P.2d 338] ; Fennessey v. Pacific Gas&; JiJlec. Co., 10 Cal.2d 538, 
544 [76 P.2rl 1041.) [2, On all prrsumptions are in 
favor of the order granting a new trial (Abercrombie v. Thom-
sen, fi9 Cal. A pp.2rl 381, 335 ! ] 88 P .2r1 7011 : 1V cavcr v. 8hrll 
Oil Co., 129 Cal.App. 232, 233 f18 P.2d 736] ), and the order 
will be affirmed if it may be sustnin,•d on any grouml (Brown 
v. George Pepprrrline Ji'oundation, 2~l Ca1.2(1 256, 262 [143 
*Assigned by Oil airman of Judicial Council. 
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118 Cal.App. 198, 200 P.2d 
court might have ruled dif-
in the first instance. v. Desser, 8 Cal.2d 29, 
30 [63 P.2d v. Debrincat, 18 CaLApp.2d 730, 
733-734 P.2d 960].) In the of these settled rules, 
we have concluded that the order a new trial in the 
affirmed. 
The accident occurred about 8 'clock on the morning 
of 6, at the intersection of Powell and California 
Streets in San Francisco. 'l'he operates a northerly-south-
cable car line on Powell Street and an easterly-westerly 
one on California Street. The deceased was struck by a north-
bound Powell Street cable car after he had alighted from a 
southbound one. He was on his way to work at the Stanford 
Court Apartments, which are situated at the southwest corner 
of the intersection. To take on and discharge passengers, the 
southbound cable car stops in the southwest part of the 
intersection with its front in the southern crosswalk across 
Powell Street. The car has an open front part, with the grip-
man operating the car from his position in a space between 
two benches extending along the car's longitudinal axis. 
The passengers on the front left-hand bench have no access 
to any other part of the car and must alight to the left between 
the southbound and northbound tracks. As shown by the 
scale map in evidence, the distance between these tracks is 
5 feet 10 inches; the tracks in each direction are 4 feet wide. 
A cable car, according to the scale model in evidence, is 8 feet 
wide, with a wheel distance of 4 feet and an overhang 2 feet 
wide at each side. The free space between two passing cable 
cars is therefore 1 foot 10 inches. 
The first point to be determined is whether there was error 
in giving instructions on the degree of care required of a 
carrier toward an alighting passenger. The court instructed 
as follows: "The responsibility imposed by law upon a carrier 
of passengers for hire, such as the operation of a cable rail-
way, includes the duty to provide a reasonably safe place 
where the passengers may board or alight from the cable cars. 
''If you find from the evidence that the deceased ·was exer-
cising ordinary care for his own safety and that he had been 
discharged as a passenger at and was occupying a place de-
signed by defendant City and as a regular stopping 
place for the discharge of passengers, then the defendant City 
and County owed to the deceased the duty to exercise the 





to be used, 
"'fhe of carrier and passenger, and the obliga~ 
tion to exercise the utmost care and diligence to provide safe 
carriage of passengers, continues until such time as an alight-
ing passenger has reasonable to reach a plaee out-
side of the immediate sphere of activity of the earrier which 
might reasonably constitute an active hazard to the pas-
sengers.'' 
The parties agree that these instructions correctly state 
the law. However, defendants contend that these principles 
are not applicable because "the carrier-passenger relationship 
had terminated as a matter of law when deceased alighted 
from the cable car and cleared the car from which he 
alighted.'' But such conclusion here 'Would too rigidly re-
strict the carrier-passenger relation and the duty of utmost 
care whieh attaches to it. 
[ 4] It is true that ordinarily the relation of passenger 
and carrier terminates when a streetcar passenger alights 
upon a public street and clears the car from which he alights 
(JJ1acLcan v. City & County of San Francisco, 127 Cal.App.2d 
263, 271 [27:5 P.2d 698]; 11:IcA v. LfJs Llnuclcs Ry. Corp., 
67 Cal.App.2d 486.480 [154 P.2d 911]; Cl10qu.citc v. Key Sys-
tem Transit Co., 118 Cal.App. 643,632633 [3 I'.2c1921]), but 
there are certain qualifications to be noted aecording to the 
circumstances of the case. In Dayton v. Yellow Cab. Co., 85 
Cal.App.2d 740 [193 P.2d 959], it was said at page 745 that 
"until the passenger reaehes a place outside the sphere of any 
activity of the carrier which might reasonably constitute a 
mobile or animated hazard to the passenger, the rule of utmost 
care and diligence set forth in Civil Code, section 2100, still 
applies.'' In Boa v. San Francisco-Oakland T. Rys., 182 Cal. 
93 [187 P. 2], at pages 100-101, approval is given to the prin-
ciples that "responsibility continues until the passenger has 
had a reasonable opportunity of getting away from the car 
without injury"; that it is :for the jury to decide whether or 
not the carrier allowed its passenger ''a reasonable oppor-
tunity to leave its car in safety and thus to pass beyond its 
care''; and that these rules apply to streetcar passengers 
specifically in eases o:f accidents ''caused by the negligent use 
[47 C.2d 
instrumentalities." (See 
69 Cal.App.2d 388 
an testified as to the happening 
of the accident: That he saw the deceased, when 6 feet south 
of the rear end of the stopped southbound cable car, walking 
north between the southbound and northbound tracks; that 
at the same time a northbound Powell Street cable car was 
approaching with its front in the southern crosswalk across 
Powell Street and then about 20 feet behind the deceased; 
that as the latter car drew near, the deceased turned around, 
throwing up his hands as he faced the oncoming car; and 
that evidently after being the deceased staggered back-
wards a few feet and fell to the pavement. 
This evidence would support the conclusion that the de-
ceased, sitting on the left front bench of the southbound cable 
car and after it had stopped, alighted in the only possible 
way between the tracks ; that the narrow space between passing 
cars-1 foot 10 inches-was not safe for the discharge of pas-
sengers if a car from the south should then approach, espe-
cially when unnoticed; and that the deceased had not had a 
reasonable opportunity to get away before being struck. We 
therefore conclude that the foregoing instructions were prop-
erly given, and that the question of whether the carrier-pas-
senger relationship had terminated was properly left to the 
jury as a question of fact for its determination. 
[6a] Nor was it improper for the trial court to give an 
instruction on the presumption of due care on the part of the 
deceased at the time of the accident. [7] While under some 
circumstances there is no room for the presumption where the 
party whose claimed negligence is at issue either himself 
testifies or introduces evidence in his own behalf as to his acts 
and conduct immediately preceding and at the time of the 
accident (Speck v. Sarver, 20 CaL2d 585, 587-588 [128 P.2d 
16] ; ZoLlars v. Barber, 140 Cal.App.2d 502, 506 [295 P.2d 
561] ) , the benefit of the presumption is available if such per-
son be deceased and the testimony of plaintiffs' witnesses 
respecting the deceased's acts and conduct at the time in-
volved is not "wholly irreconcilable" with such presumption. 
(Gigliotti v. Nttnes, 45 Cal.2d 85, 93 [286 P.2d 809].) 
[6b] Our review of the record here leads to the conclusion 
that the testimony of plaintiffs' witnesses was not wholly 
irreconcilable with the presumption. 
The parties' final dispute is twofold with respect to the 
Jan. BRANDELms v. CITY & CouNTY OF S. F. 
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'"!'here up in our 





an accident case, and which is known as the doctrine of last 
clear chance. It is to use the doctrine after 
we first find, and you may not use it unless and until you first 
shall have fouml, that in the events leading up to the accident 
in both the deceased and defendants were negligent. 
'''I' he doctrine of last clear chance may be invoked if, and 
only if, you find from the evidence that these facts 
existed: 
''First: That deceased, by his own negligence, got himself 
into a position of danger. 
"Second: That thereupon, either it was physically im-
possible for him, through the exercise of ordinary care, to 
escape from the danger, or he was totally unaware of impend-
ing danger in his position. 
"Third: That the defendant had actual knowledge of the 
perilous situation of the deceased. 
"J~ourth: That it appeared to the defendant, or would have 
appeared to him in the exercise of ordinary care, that de-
ceased either was unaware of the danger impending in the 
situation or was unable to escape therefrom through the 
exercise of ordinary care. 
"Fifth: That after the defendant acquired actual knowl-
edge of the perilous situation of the deceased, he had a clear 
opportunity to avoid the accident and could have done so by 
exercising ordinary care. 
''Sixth: That the defendant did not avail himself of that 
opportunity, but by negligent conduct proximately caused the 
accident. 
"If all the conditions just mentioned are found by you 
to have existed with respect to the accident in question, then 
you must find against the defense of contributory negligence, 
because under such conditions, the law holds the defendant 
liable for any injury suffered by the [deceased] and proxi-
mately resulting from the accident, despite the negligence of 
the [deceased]." While this instruction has appeared in cer-




chance doctrine was enunciated 
216 202 [13 P.2d 915], 
several recent cases. (Doran v. 
44 Cal.2d 477, 483 [283 P.2d 
San s·upra, 40 Cal. 
39 Cal.2d 290, 293 [246 
supra, 38 Cal.2d 107, 109-
38 Cal.2d 102, 104 [237 P .2d 645].) 
t }w conditions for the applica-
tion of doctrine as set forth in said decisions, it should 
be noted that the time element is the all important factor. In 
other if the doctrine is to be applied and a recovery 
is to be the contributory negligence of the 
injured party, there must be substantial evidence to show that 
the defendant had a last clear chance to avoid the accident 
by the use of ordinary care following the time that the injured 
had lost any similar opportunity to avoid the accident 
by the usc of such care. Under such circumstances, the in-
person's does not bar a re-
covery, for it has been said that "vVhen the doctrine applies, 
plaintiff's becomes remote rather than proximate 
in causation. If it doC's liot , his negligence remains 
proximate in its causation and will bar his recovery.'' (Gird-
ner v. Union Oil supra, 216 Cal. 197, 204.) [9] It is 
therefore essential that the jury be correctly instructed con-
cerning the time :for defendant's required exercise of any 
alleged last clear chance. 
The as enunciated in the Girdner case, purports 
to delineate all the essential elements for the application of 
the doctrine. It appears, however, that many attempts have 
since been made to the formula when instructing 
juries upon the subject. Many of these attempts have resulted 
in confusion. One of such attempted amplifications is ex-
('mplified by the BA,TT instruction whieh was given here. In 
this connection, it is of interest to note that while said in-
struction has appeared in the generally excellent and useful 
Jan.l957] BRANDELIUS V. CITY & CoUNTY OF S. F. 739 
[47 C.2d 729; 306 
there may be need for elarification. Such 
including a rearling of the authorities upon 
is based, has lerl us to the conclusion that 
language in some of the that 
might be stated more clearly. 
It would serve no useful purpose to 
the last clear chance doctrine or the 
based. [10] \Ve need note tbat" 
the formula 
is certain loose 
formula itself 
of 
tions the strict rules as to the defense of negli-
gence haYe been modified the doctrine of last clear chance. 
This doctrine, which 
ments in terms of 
many years. 'l'he 
conditions for its in this state may be traced 
through the anthoritirs cited in the Girflner case, and to these 
740 BRANDELIFS v. CITY & COUNTY OF S. F. [47 C.2d 
; Young v. 






149 Cal. 18 
Cal. 293 [67 P. ; Wahlgren v. lriarket Street Ry. Co., 
132 Cal. 656 [62 P. 308, 64 P. 993] Het·bert v. Southern 
Pae. 121 CaL 227 P. 651] ; Everett v. Los Angeles 
etc. Ry. 115 Cal. 105 [ 43 P. 46 P. 889, 34 hR.A. 
350]; Holmes v. South Pac. C. Ry. Co., 97 Cal. 161 [31 P. 
; Meeks v. Smdhern Pac. 5G CaL 513 \38 .L\m.Rep. 
67]; Needham" v. San Pt·ancisco & S. J. R. Co., 37 Cal. 409.) 
[11] The as reiterated in the recent cases in three 
numbered subdivisions, reads as follows: "(1) That plaintiff 
has been negligent and, as a result thereof, is in a position of 
danger from which he cannot escape by the exercise of ordi-
nary care; and this includes not only where it is physically 
impossible for him to escape, but also in cases where he is 
totally unaware of his danger and for that reason unable to 
escape; that defendant has knowledge that the plaintiff is 
in such a situation, and or in the exercise of ordinary 
care should know, that plaintiff cannot escape from such 
situation; and (3) has the last clear chance to avoid the acci-
dent by exercising ordinary care, and fails to exereise the 
same, and the aecident results thereby, and plaintiff is in-
jured as the proximate result of such failure." (Doran v. 
City & Cognty San supra, 44 CaL2d 477, 483; 
Daniels v. City & County of San Francisco, Stl.pra, 40 Cal.2d 
614, 619.) 
This formula thus uses the term ''position of danger'' 
(subd. 1) and requires that "defendant has knowledge that 
the plaintiff is in sueh a position" (subd. 2). It further re-
quires that defendant "knows, or in the exercise of ordinary 
care should know, that plaintiff cannot escape from such 
situation'' Tlwrefore the time~ for the exer-
cise by defendant of any last dear as drfined in the 
formula, commences only at such time as defendant has both 
(1) actual knowledge of the injured person's "position of 
danger" and (2) actual or constructive knowledge that the 
BRANDELros v. CITY & CouNTY OF S. F. 741 
C.2d 
per-




motorman sees a m the middle of the 
track at such intersection at a time when the streetcar is a 
considerable distance tllrrefrom. The motorman then has 
actual knowledge of tl1e presence of the pedestrian on the 
track and in a of in the busy intersection. 
Being a considerable distanee from the intersection, however, 
the motorman may not have knowledge of any fact 
which would lead or any reasonable man, to believe that 
the pedestrian ''is in a of danger from which he 
cannot escape by the exercise of ordinary care." On the 
contrary, the circumstanees might be such that any reasonable 
man could assume at that point of time that the pedestrian, 
in the exercise of ordinary care, would no longer be in such 
position of danger when the streetcar ultimately reaches the 
intersection. It is after the later point of time during 
the approach of the car when the motorman ''knows, or in 
the exercise of ordinary care should know,'' that the pedestrian 
"cannot escape from such situation" that the motorman may 
become liable under the last clear chance doctrine, despite 
the pedestrian's 11 egligence, for a failure to exercise his last 
clear chance, if any, "to avoid the accident by exercising 
ordinary care.'' 
If the formula in its accepted form may be said to 
lack clarity, we believe it is by reason of the possible doubt 
concerning the relation between the term ''position of danger,'' 
in the first subdivision, and the term "such a situation," in 
the second subdivision. \V e are convinced, however, that the 
term ''such a situation'' was intended to refer solely to the 
term ''position of danger'' in the :first subdivision, for if it 
was intended to refer to the entire first subdivision and thereby 
require actual knowledge of plaintiff's inability to escape, 
supra, 40 Cal.2d ; Peterson v. Bnrklwlter, snpra, 
38 Cal.2d 111; supra, 38 Cal.2d 102, 105; 
Basharn v. Southern Pac. Co., S1tpra, 176 Cal. 320, 324), 
there appears to be no doubt nmn'"'"'0 the meaning of the 
formula in this 
Our conclusion the nature of the requisite 
''knowledge'' or '' '' on the part of defendant is 
fortified by the following statement: ''As to what it is neces-
sary for the defendant to discover, there is further disagree-
ment among courts adhering to the prevailing view. Some 
of them apparently hold that he must in fact realize the 
plaintiff's danger and his inattention; the greater number 
and require only that he 
discover the and that the danger and lack of at-
tention be to a reasonable man.'' (Prosser on 
rrorts, second p. 294.) [14] Thus under the 
prevailing view as well as under the California 
cases, actual of plaintiff's position of danger is 
but constructive knowledge of his inability to 
escape will suii'iee. 
In the of these observations, we shall restate the 
that such restatement may result in 
so, we shall use the word ''plaintiff,'' 
as used in the accepted formula, rather than "de-
ceased,'' as used in the challenged instruction. On the other 
formula m the 
we shall use the tense, as was done in the chal-
and shall restate the formula in terms as 
simple as the subject will in order that it may serve 
as the basis for instructions to juries. The first and last 
Jan. 1957] BRANIIEr~rus CITY & CouNTY S. F'. 
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danger; 
position of exercise of 
ordinary care unable 
to escape therefrom; and that thereafter defendant had 
the last clear chance to avoid the accident the exercise 
of ordinary care but failed to exercise such last ciear ehance, 
and the accideut occurred as a result of such 
failure. 
In restating the formula, it has not been our purpose 
to add to or detract from the conditions prescribed in the 
approved formula set forth in the Girdller ease and reiterated 
in our recent deeisions. On the the main purpose 
has been to state more clearly the vital time element involved 
in the application of the doctrine. construed, both 
statements of the formula conf1ition the commencement of 
the time for the exercise by defendant of any alleged last 
clear chance upon defendant's aetnal of plaintiff's 
position of danger and defendant's further actual 
or constructive, of to escape therefrom. 
[16] Amplifkation of the last clear chance formula in 
instruetions to juries is not if sueh 
tion does not tend to confuse and mislead the 011 thr 
essential elements for the applieation of the doetrine. 
The vice of the challenged instruction m this case rests 
in the confusing manner in which it 
divisions the last elear ehanee 
terms "position of danger" and " 
any clear im1ieation of \Ylwther said terms are or are not in-
tended to be synonymous, a]l(l its subdh·ision 
ditions the eomnw1wemcnt of the time for 
the last clear (•hanec upon defendant 
"actual of the sitnation" 
744 
be synonymous with the term '' 
in the first the instruction is er-
roneous, as the commencement of the time for the exercise of 
any last chance then conditioned upon de-
fendant's actual Of the "nn•<lTl!OYl 
of " 
appears, 
'' in relation to 
the third and fifth the terms ''position 
of danger" and "perilous situation" ·were intended to be 
synonymous and would be so understood, as the further re-
quirement of either actual or constructive knowledge on the 
part of defendant of the injured person's inability to escape 
is dealt with in the fourth subdivision. At 
least, there is such ambiguity in the of the instruc-
tion that it is misleading and confusing, and it cannot be held 
to be a correct exposition of the requirement of the last clear 
chance doctrine. 
Whether the giving of this erroneous instruction was 
prejudicial need not be determined by this court on this 
appeal from the order granting new trial. [18] It is 
true that section of article Vf of our Constitution should 
control the action of the trial court in a motion 
for a new trial, but when the trial court has determined that 
the error in the instructions was prejndieial and has there-
fore granted the motion, the sole issue bl'Eore the appellate 
court is whether the trial court has abused its discretion. 
(l~Iazzota v. Los Angeles Ry. Corp., supra, 25 Cal.2d 165, 
170-171; Bolton v. Mart in, 126 Cal.App.2d 178, 179-180 [271 
P.2d 991) ; Pope v. W em:sch, 109 Cal.App. 608, 611-612 [293 
P. 622].) As was said in Pope v. Wenisch, supra, at 
pages 611-612: ''There may be some doubt as to whether 
this error was prejudicial. The trial court evidently believed 
that it was. In granting a motion for new trial on the ground 
of erroneous instrnetiom; it is proper that a wide discretion 
should be allowed to the trial court and the order granting 
the new trial should not be disturbed unless there appears to 
be an abuse of discretion. (Thompson v. Cal1:[orni,a Const. Co., 
148 Cal. 35 P. 367]; Associated Ft·uit Co. v. Marone, 68 
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And 
reasonable 
fused the jury." 
As the affirmance of the order here will result in a 
new we should declare further that we find no merit 
in defendants' final claim that there was no substantial evi-
dence to the giving of any instruction on the last 
dear chance doctrine. vV e need only note that conflicting 
inferences could be drawn from the testimony concerning the 
time that the gripman Mosley "knew that [deceased] was in 
a position of danger and further knew, or in the exercise of 
ordinary care should have known, that [deceased] was unable 
to escape therefrom.'' The jury was not bound by Mosley's 
testimony that the deceased stepped off the southbound cable 
car when Mosley's northbound cable car was only 4 feet from 
the point of impact. There was other substantial evidence 
from which the jury could have inferred that the deceased had 
stepped off the car when Mosley's car was a considerable dis-
tance from the point of impact; that Mosley had an un-
obstructed view of the situation for at least 135 feet; that 
after alighting, the deceased had walked northerly between 
the tracks for approximately 20 or 30 feet before being 
struck; and that Mosley had a last clear chance to avoid 
the aecident by the use of ordinary care, after actually having 
seen the deceased in his position of danger and after having 
knowledge, actual or constructive, that the deceased could 
no longer escape from his position of danger because of his 
unawareness of the approach of Mosley's car. Thus the evi-
dence, although eonflicting, >vould have warranted the giving 
of a proper instruction on the last clear chance doctrine, as 
the jury might have found from the evidence most favorable 
to plaintiff that the doctrine was applieable. (DanieLs v. City 
& County of San supra, 40 Cal.2d 614, 623; Wright 
v. Los Angeles Ry. 14 Oal.2d 168, 178-179 [93 P.2d 
135].) 
In view of our conelusion, however, that the last clear 
chance instruction which was given was erroneous and could 
[47 C.2d 
we cannot hold that the 
its discretion in granting a new trial. 
trial is affirmed. 
Schauer, J., and McComb, J., con-
dissent. 
hairsplitting technical construction 
on the last clear chance doctrine is just 
of that doctrine as the refusal to submit a case 
on the last clear chance theory where the facts 
such submission Rodabaugh v. Tekus, 39 Cal.2d 
P.2d ; Doran v. City & County of San Francisco, 
Cal.2d 477 P .2d 1] ) . Although I tried many cases, 
Girdner v. Union Oil Co., 216 Cal. 197 [13 P.2d 
the last clear chance doctrine, I am more con-
after the majority opinion, than ever before 
the doctrine is applicable. It is my considered 
that it is too much to expect of a judge or a lawyer, 
much less a juror, to follow the tortuous mental process re-
sorted to the majority here in holding that the trial court 
committed prejudicial error in giving BAJI instruction Num-
205 to the As I read that instruction there is 
no error in its formulation which can justify the 
granting of defendants' motion for a new trial. The sup-
error is that the jury, by meticulous analysis and appli-
cation of the instruction, could relieve the plaintiff from the 
effect of the deceased's contributory negligence although the 
within the time in which he had a clear chance to 
avoid the had no knowledge, actual or constructive, 
of the deceased's inability to escape from his position of 
This interpretation can be drawn only by ignoring 
the effect of the instruction in its entirety. The reasoning of 
the appears to be that because the Fifth subdivision 
states: "That after the defendant acquired actual knowledge 
of the situation of the deceased, he had a clear op-
to avoid the accident and could have done so by 
ordinary care,'' it follows that there is no require-
ment that defendant knew, or should have known, that it was 
impossible for the deceased to escape from the danger. The 
flaw in this reasoning is that it completely ignores the Fourth 
subdivision which requires the jury to find: ''That it appeared 
to the defendant, or would have appeared to him in the exer-
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cise of ordinary care, that deceased 
the danger impending in the situation or 
therefrom through the exercise of 
requirement is to have any 
the deceased's inability to escape 
the defendant, actually or 
still has an opportunity to avoid 
interpretation renders the Fourth 
less and it is unreasonable to conclude 
interpret and apply the instruction. 
While it cannot be disputed that 
with a wide discretion in granting a new 
of erroneous instructions, it is equally established 
the instructions are correct, the of 
almsr of discretion. v. Snuih 
Cal.2d 633 [241 P.2d 535]; Parker v. 
[230 P.2d 823].) Furthermore, as the court 
v. Fidelity & Cas1wUy Co., 16 
P.2d 83], "It is fundamental in 
a part of one instruction may not be 
text and made the object of criticism 
tions taken in their entirety correctly arlvised 
to the law." It must be borne in mind that thr trial court. 
in considering the propriety of a motion 
guided by section 41;2 of article VI of thr 
which provides, in part, that: "No 
aside, 01· new t1'ial granted, in any case, on the 
d1:rcction of the Jury ... unless, after an 
the entire case, including the evidence, the 
of the opinion that the error complained of has rrsu Hed in 
miscarriage of justice." (Emphasis addrd.) 
even though there be error in the to tl1e 
granting of a new trial is not justified nn 1rss the error 
is prejudicial. (Sparks v. Redinqcr, 44 Cal.2d 121, 
P.2d 971] ; BroU'n v. GcoJ"(JC 
2d 256, 262 [143 P.2d 929]; Nat'CJo v. F'rrsno 
44 Cal.App.2d 868, 872 [113 P.2d . ) 
An examination of the case law reveals that error of a 
much more substantial nature than t1mt whi(•h 
in BAJI 205 is required to justify the 
In Earncs v. Ilavcr, 111 Ca1. 401 P. 11 
whieh was admittedly obscure in its 
be prejudicially erroneous anrl. court re-
Yersed an order granting a motion for a new trial. In Moran 







168 [231 P.2d , we 
said that: ' error does not result from 
the giving of an instruction meticulous 
analysis, might be a 
subject to 'criticism.' " In 
2d 121, 123, Mr. Justice for 
the majority, observed that '' 
than the appellate court, is expressly 
section 4lf2, of our Constitution from a new trial for 
error of law unless such error is prejudicial. If it clearly 
appears that the error could not have affected the result of the 
trial, the court is bound to the motion.'' In the Sparks 
case the majority of this court held that the failure of the 
trial court to give the plaintiffs' requested instructions on 
last clear chance in an accident case was not prejudicial error 
which would support the lower court's of ' 
motion for a new trial. 
In the cases which have affirmed the granting of a new trial 
on the ground of erroneous instructions there were obvious 
errors which were clearly prejudicial to the moving party. 
The three cases cited in the majority opinion are exemplary. 
In Mazzotta v. Los Angeles Ry. Corp., 25 Cal.2d 165 [153 
P.2d 338], the instructions omitted the element of proximate 
cause as a requisite to the defendant's liability. In Bolton v. 
Martin, 126 Cal.App.2d 178 [271 P.2d 991], an instruction 
given on last clear chance failed to distinguish between the 
plaintiff's awareness of danger and her a\vareness of an 
approaching automobile regardless of its at the 
time. In Pope v. W enisch, 109 Cal.App. 608 [293 P. 622], the 
instructions failed to state that in order to relieve defendant 
from liability, plaintiff's contributory must be the 
proximate cause of the injury. In eaeh of these cases there 
were patent omissions of instructions on material issues and 
the trial court, accordingly, was held to be within the bounds 





for more than 
years, to the 
of innumerable trial and 
In Daniels v. & County 
614 P .2d , we held that it was error to refuse to 
BA,JI 205 and page 617, that: "The form of the 
(See also Cole v. Riclings, 95 
; Mangler v. Pacific Electric 
[163 P.2d 774].) The record in 
this ease shows that the error was not urged by counsel 
fo1· nor considered the trial judge on the motion 
for ne>v trial. Having thus escaped detection, it seems mani-
fest that any error in the instruction is absolutely without 
consequence. 
Por this reason, I would reverse the order granting a new 
trial. 
[Crim. No. 5800. In Bank. Jan. 25, 1957.) 
'l'IlE PEOPLE, Respondent, v. WILBERT FELIX FRIEND, 
Appellant. 
[1] Homicide-Instructions-Punishment.--An instruction that a 
prisoner sentenced to either death or life imprisonment may be 
pardoned or may have his sentence reduced by the Governor, 
and that a prisoner serving a life sentence may be paroled but 
not until he has served at least seven years, correctly states 
code rules of law (Pen. Code, §§ 3046, 4800), which are perti-
nent as matters of fact to be considered in determining penalty 
rather than as propositions of law; it is presumed that de-
fendant, if he had sought to do so, would have been accorded 
opportunity to show other related facts as to minimum, median 
and maximum terms of imprisonment actually served for first 
degree murder, and he cannot complain on appeal of the giving 
of such factually accurate instruction. 
[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Homicide, § 321 et seq.; Am.Jur., Homicide, 
§ 580 et seq. 
McK. Dig. References: [I, 7, 10, 13] Homicide, § 236; [2, 4-6, 9, 
11] Homicide, § 242; [3, 8, 12] Criminal Law, § 632; [14] Homicide, 
§ 239. 
